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in military service. This is also true of a very large proportion
of those who expected to enter as first year students. Several of
those who returned had been rejected for military service. Students in the College of Law have no peculiar grounds for exemption, are on the average of greater maturity than the students in
any other college of the University, and from their record are
unexcelled for patriotic devotion. A member of last year's second
year class who is now a first lieutenant in the National Army correctly expressed College-of-Law sentiment in saying "I would'
be ashamed of the school if it didn't have a large reduction in
attendance at such a time."
The faculty remains unchanged except for the resignation of
Associate Professor D. C. Howard who has entered practice in
Charleston. It is with much regret that the College of Law loses
his efficient services as a teacher and as editor of the Note Department in THE BAR.
Considerable additions have been made to the law library during the summer and fall, so that it now contains the reports of all
the states. The acquisition of about ninety volumes of briefs and
records from the library of the late Judge T. C. Green of Charles
Town, covering cases decided from 1876 to 1887, has added much
to the value of that collection. Valuable gifts have been received
from the library of the late Henry M. Russell of Wheeling and
from the library of Price, Smith, Spilman & Clay of Charleston.
Last spring a large portion of the library of the late Col. Robert
White of Wheeling, former Attorney General, was purchased,
thereby adding much to the library's rare and valuable collection
of Virginia Acts, Codes and early practice books. The total number of volumes in the law library now exceeds eleven thousand.
A printed catalog of the library for distribution to members of
the bar is in course of preparation.

VENUE IN EQUITY AS DEPENDING UPON THE SITUS OF THE LAND.

A recent West Virginia case, Wirgman v. Provident Life &
Trust Company,' by allusion, seems to cast doubt upon a former
ruling of the same court in Rader v. Adamson2 touching upon a
question of venue. In Rader v. Adamson, the court decided that,
-

-92 S. E. 416 (W. Va. 1917).
287 W. Va. 582, 595.
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in a suit to subject land to a vendor's lien, the venue may be based
upon the residence of one of the defendants, regardless of the
situs of the land. A decision of this question involves construetion of the West Virginia statute relating to venue.3 This statute,
in so far as it relates specifically to the above question of venue,
has been sparsely construed, and most frequently with the eyes
of the court diverted upon common-law principles. In order to
grasp a definite understanding of the problem involved in construing the statute, it should be noted that the statute expressly
excludes ejectment and unlawful detainer from its operation, as
far as venue based on residence of a defendant is concerned,
merely affirming the common-law rule based upon the local nature
of these actions and confining the venue to the situs of the land. 4
Hence, the problem is one peculiarly involving venue in equity.
Independently of statute, a decision of the question of venue in
equity depends upon whether the proceeding is in personam or in
rem; in other words, whether it affects the land only indirectly
by acting upon the person, as by rescission of a contract of sale,
or whether it acts directly upon the land, as by sale under a decree
of court or delivery of pogsession under such a decree. Following the analogy of the law, equity considers all proceedings in
personam transitory in nature, and in such cases venue follows
the person; but proceedings in rem are looked upon as local, and
venue therein is localized by the situs of the land involved in the
litigation.5 Hence, since a suit to enforce a lien against land is
from its very nature included within the classification of proceedings in rem, the venue in such a case is exclusively controlled by
the situs of the land."
Assuming that the above rules are based on the weight of authority, it necessarily follows that in West Virginia the venue of a
suit to recover land or to subject it to a debt must be based on the
'W. Va. Code, c. 123, § 1, (1) and (3) : "Any action at law or suit in equity,
except where it is otherwise specially provided, may hereafter be brought in the
circuit court of any county: (i) wherein any of the defendants may reside, except
that an action of ejectment or unlawful detainer must be brought in the county
wherein the land sought to be recovered or some part thereof is; - . . or (3) if
it be to recover land or subject it to a debt wherein such land or any part thereof
may be."

'Idem, cl. (1).
VLawrence v. DuBols, 16 W. Va. 443, 455-6, and cases cited.
GBullitt v. Eastern Kentucky Land Co., 90 Ky. 324, 36 S. W. 16; Burt, etc.,
Lumber Co. v. Bailey, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1264, 60 S. W. 485; Connor W. Dillard, 129
N. C. 50, 39 S. E. 641 : Bacot v. Lowndes, 24 S. C. 392; Mack v. Austin, 67 Kan.
36, 72 Pac. 551.
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situs of the land, or some part thereof, unless the West Virginia
statute has changed the law in this respect. Venue in West Virginia is comprehensively regulated by statute. But it should be
noted that common-law principles pertaining thereto are not expressly abolished, nor are they annulled by implication, except
7
where the statute specifically prescribes a contrary rule.
The particular question of statutory construction involved, for
purposes of- this discussion, is whether clauses (1) and (3), § 1,
ch. 123, of the West Virginia Code, are coordinate in effect and
optionally available where the two independent grounds of venue
exist in the same case, or whether clause (3) is an exception qualifying clause (1). In other words, where the suit is to recover
land or to subject it to a debt, must the venue correspond with the
situs of the land, or may it be based upon the residence of one of
the defendants, regardless of the situs of the land?
In Rader v. Adamson," without citing any authority except the
statute, the court held that the suit was properly brought in the
county where one of the defendants resided, although no part of
the land was situated therein. Rader v. Adamson is not entirely
without authority for such a rule, either in Virginia 9 or in West
Virginia.10 Furthermore, a literal acceptation of the language of

I Vinal

v. Core, 18 W. Va. 1, 21-22.
The defendant upon whose residence venue was based had no interest in the subject of the suit except as custodian of notes secured by the lien, with power to
collect, and was made a defendant only for purposes of securing a discovery and
accounting.
Construing a statute practically similar to the West Virginia statute, it was
held in Harrison v. wissler, 98 Va. 597, 36 S. E. 982, that the word "may" (at
the beginning of § 1, c.-123, W. Va. Code) does not mean "must". The same case
also holds that clauses (1) and (7) (the latter relating to causes in which a circuit Judge is interested) are optionally available and that clause (7) does not
qualify or limit clause (1).
By analogy, the same reasoning may be applied to
clauses (1) and (3).
In Clayton v. Henley, 32 Gratt. 65, a suit to subject land
to a lien, venue was in. the county where one parcel of the land involved in the
litigation was situated. Held, that there were two grounds of venue; situs of the land
and residence of a defendant, but that the latter ground alone would have been
sufficient. Bunxs', PLEADING AND PRaCTiCE, 283-4, citing a note by Professor Lile
in 6 Va. Law Reg. 475, says that a suit to subject land to a debt may be brought
in any county where the land Is or "where any one of the defendants resides".
"OIn Lawrence v. DuBois, supra, a suit to declare a deed absolute on its face a
mortgage, the land was situated in Boone County and the suit was in Kanawha
County, the county in which the defendant grantee resided. Held, that the suit was
properly brought in Kanawha County. It should be noted, however, that the court
says that the venue would have been proper although the land had been outside of
the state. Hence, although the court refers to the statute, the question seems to
have been decided independently of the statute, on the distinction between proceedings in rem and in personam, the court holding that this was a proceeding in personam, and, hence, seemingly, not within the provisions of clause (3), § 1, c. 123,
Code, regardless of the meaning of that clause. The latter case seems to have
8
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the statute may be taken to justify the holding of Rader v. Adamson. Also, it should be noted that clause (1), § 1, of the statute
expressly excludes ejectment and unlawful detainer from its operation, thereby making venue in such actions, in accord with the
common law, depend upon the situs of the land. Upon the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, this express exception
may be taken as an implied exclusion of any other exception, e. g.,
equitable proceedings in rem.
On the other hand, in West Virginia at least, the doctrine of
Rader v. Adamson does not stand unchallenged. In Tennant's
Heirs v. Fretts et al.,11 the court uses the following language"The land is situated in Monongalia County, and this gave the
court of that county jurisdiction. Cooley v. Scarlet, 38 Ill. 316,
The suit could not have been brought in any other court.' 2 It is
local in its nature, like the abating of a nuisance, Miss. & Mo. R.
R. Go. v. Ward, 2 Black (U. S.) 485; or the enjoining of an act
which affects real estate, Northern Ind. R. R. Go. v. Michigan Gent.
R. R. Go., 15 How. 233."
The above suit was a proceeding to remove cloud from title. A
suit to subject land to a debt would seem to be more a proceeding
in rem than is a suit to remove cloud from title. If the local nature of the proceeding confines the venue in the one case to the
situs of the land, regardless of clause (1) of the statute referring
to the residence of a defendant, then it is difficult to see why the
same restriction should not prevail in the other case. Tennant v.
Fretts, at least by way of dictum, overrules Rader v. Adamson.
In Laidley v. Reynolds,5 Judge Brannon says (referring to
argument of counsel), "This is rested on chapter 123, § 1, Code,
saying that a suit to subject land to a debt must [the italics are
ours] be brought in the county where the land is," seeming to
construe the word "may" in the statute. as meaning "must."
Finally, we have the principal case, a suit against non-residents
been based on the same reasoning as Woodcock v. Barrick, 91 S. E. (W. Va.) 396,
where the court took jurisdiction in Wetzel County to cancel contracts for the sale
of land situated in the State of Ohio.
"67 W. Va. 569, Syl. points 3 and 4, and p. 573; s. c. 68 S. E. 387, 29 L. R,
A. (N. S.) 625, 140 Am. St. Rep. 979.
"The latter sentence may be dictum, but it is unequivocal. It will be noted that
the court here entirely ignores the statute, basing its reasoning on common-law
principles alone.
=58 W. Va. 418, 422, 52 S. E. 405. The remark of Judge Brannon is dic.tum,*
and may have been inadvertent, as far as use of the word "must" is concerned; but
it clearly shows his mental attitude toward the statute.
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for the purpose of cancelling fraudulent conveyances. The defendants being non-residents, venue could not be based on clause
(1), § 1, ch. 123. The court did not have jurisdiction of the parties. And, since the suit was not brought in the county where the
land was situated, the bill was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
to proceed in rem. Obviously, since neither ground of venue provided by the statute existed in the principal case, the question of
right to elect between the two different grounds did not enter essentially into a decision of the case. At any rate, the court expresses
its understanding of the statute: "Any suit or proceeding
brought primarily to affect the title to land must be instituted in
the county in which the land or- some part of it is situated. Tennant v. Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.)
625, 140 Am. St. Rep. 979; Code, c. 123, § 1, el. 3 (§ 4734).
Rader v. Adamson, 37 W. Va. 582, 16 S. E. 808, recognizes an exception to this rule. Whether it is well founded, it is not now
necessary to say." 4 This language may be taken as a very broad
hint that the court has doubts as to the correctness of the doctrine
in Rader v. Adamson. It should be noted that the principal case
not only, by citing Tennant v. Fretts, bases its reasoning on the
common-law distinction between local and transitory proceedings,
but also relies upon the statute itself as confining the venue to the
situs of the land.
There are reasons and arguments in addition to court rulings
why the situs of the land sliould control the venue, at least in proceedings in rem. Such a rule is analogous to the statutory rule
for venue in actions at law, and the statutory rule in such respect
is identical with the common-law rule." It is expedient, almost
essential, to keep the record of proceedings affecting the title to
real property, where possible at all, in the county where the property is. situated. The full doctrine of Rader v. Adanson (and it'
-would seem that to attempt to recognize exceptions to it would
-destroy the doctrine in its entirety, since it is based solely on the
-very letter of the statute, if it has any foundation at all) might
14Because neither of the defendants was resident in the state, nor was the suit
brought in the county where the land was situated, and hence there was no question
as to election between the two grounds of venue.
Unless the
15 Statutes In derogation of the common law are strictly construed.
Intention expressly so appears, it will be presumed that the common law has not
been changed. Railway Co. v. Conley and Avis, 67' W. Va. 129, 67 S. E. 613; State
ex rel. Keller v. Grymes, 65 W. Va. 451, 64 S. E. 728; Webb v. Ritter, 60 W. Va.

193. 54 S. B. 484.
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work unwarranted hardships on defendants. The fact that there
are different degrees of parties in equity lends opportunity for
mischief in the application of such a doctrine. Venue based on the
residence of a party having only a slight interest in the subject
of the suit, or having only a collateral interest in respect to the
main issues, might compel a defendant landowner to defend
in a
court distant from the situs of his land, which usually is the place
of his residence or in close proximity thereto, and might at the
same time subject numerous lien creditors to the same inconvenience, for the majority of one's creditors are usually resident
in his community. It is difficult to imagine a proceeding more
local in all its phases than a creditors' suit. And all the expediency requiring the venue in ejeetment and unlawful detainer
to be confined to the situs of the land would seem to require the
same restriction as to venue in creditors' suits and other equitable
proceedings in rem.'6 The statute, although reasonably clear in
its separate provisions, requires construction as a whole. It is not
exhaustive in its scope nor exclusive of the common law. In at
least one case, 17 it was necessary to call in the principles of the
common law to aid a situation not covered by it. And since it is
remedial in its purpose, and hence could not have been intended
to introduce hardships not incidental to the common law, it might
not be considered doing violence to its terms to restrict its operation, even at the expense of literal interpretation, so as to make
it serve the purpose for which the legislature may reasonably be
presumed to have intended it. Indeed, a literal interpretation
of the statute might take clause (3), § 1, of the statute as one of
the instances coming within the provision, "Except where it is
otherwise specially provided", at the beginning of the section.
Clause (3) may be considered as more "special" than clause (1) ;
and there is no reason why clause (3), just as any other provision in the Code, may not come within this exception. 8
-L. C.
16A statute will be so construed as to avoid private injustice or public inconvenience. Old Dominion Bldg. etc. Ass'n -v. Sohn, 54 W. Va. 101, 112, 46 S. U. 222;
Hasson v. City of Chester, 67 W. Va. 278, 282, 67 S. E. 231; State V. B. & 0.
R. R. Co., 61 W. Va. 367, 56 s. E. 5i8.
7
l VInal v. Core, supra.
MIn construing a statute, the intent is paramount to the letter. Bank v. County
Court, 36 W. Va. 341, 346, 15 S. E. 78; Gas Company v. City of Wheeling, 8 W.
Va. 820.
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